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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
The editorial, signed by Dr. Dana L. Farnsworth, Cambridge, Mass.,
challenged the claim that these drugs "free" the mind for creative
work. Farnsworth said a dangerous situation is developing because
public interest in these drugs is on the increase in many sections of
the United States. "Many men and women who should not do so,
especially college students, are experimenting with these drugs," he
said.14
A majority report of the Senate subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
concluded that, with respect to deleterious side effects, the pharmaceutical
houses:
in their advertisements have tended to handle the matter in either
of two ways: Ignore side effects entirely or note and then dismiss
the subject with some sort or reassuring phrase.' 5
Testimony elicited shows that side effects of certain drugs may not become
apparent until used by "thousands and thousands of patients."' 6 In certain
instances drugs are rushed on the market with a view to meeting and beating
competition rather than to insure the maximum in controlled testing.17 Al-
though a contrary result in the instant case, i.e., computing the accrual of the
cause of action from the time of reasonable discovery of the side effects, may
not prevent the release of latently dangerous drugs on an unwary public, it
would place the risk upon the drug industry which could then chalk up the
misery it has inflicted as an item in the cost of goods sold.
William A. Carnahan
ZONING
ZONING ORDINANCE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY ESTAB-
LISHED SET-BACx LINs
A town zoning ordinance passed in 1961 required proposed dwellings to be
set back from the road edge an amount equal to a set-back line which was
determined by averaging the set-backs of existing homes within 300 feet on
either side. This repealed a 1945 ordinance which contained an identical provi-
sion. Petitioner-plaintiff, Sierra Construction Company, after having pre-
viously laid a foundation for a home with a 61 1/2 foot set-back, was refused
a building permit because the home was within 300 feet of four homes built in
1958, each having an eighty-two foot set-back. The Board of Zoning Appeals
affirmed this action. In an Article 78 proceeding, Monroe County's Supreme
14. Buffalo Courier Express, Sept. 13, 1963, p.1, col. 5.
15. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly oj the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. Report no. 448, at 198 (1961).
16. Id. at 201.
17. Id. at 187.
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Court Special Term affirmed the Board as did the Appellate Division.' Before
the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that the ordinance contravened New
York state'and federal law by giving an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power to private persons, thereby denying petitioner the use of its
property without due process or equal protection of the law. The Court held,
affirmed; three judges dissented and one concurred in the result only. The
majority concluded that a zoning ordinance requiring the set-back lines of
new dwellings to match certain existing set-back lines was constitutional.
Sierra Constr. Co., Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 12 N.Y.2d 79, 187 N.E.2d 123,
236 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1962).
State legislatures give the power to local governments to enact and en-
force zoning ordinances. This delegation is derived from the inherent police
power of the state.2 The regulation of land, by districting it for certain uses,
to encourage the earliest, permanent, and productive use of all property are
the purposes of zoning law.4 Although the police power is the only justification
for zoning ordinances approved to date, eminent domain and nuisance have
also been urged. These two ideas were rejected because of their inflexibility
and their lack of procedural safeguards.5 To insure that the police power will
provide flexibility and procedural safeguards, zoning laws have traditionally
been requierd to be related to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.0
The welfare criteria, while ,at first restricted in application, 7 has apparently
gained a more widespread use by the courts. This increased use is probably be-
cause the welfare criteria contains the element of aesthetic value as a partial
basis for the validation of zoning ordinances and set-back rules. Thus, in
some instances, proposed nonconforming structures must first be approved by
adjacent owners in order to preserve aesthetic beauty and, as a consequence,
realty values.8 In New York, as in other jurisdictions, the established rule
still seems to be that zoning cannot be justified by aesthetic purposes alone,
but must be related to some of the other public values mentioned above.9 How-
1. Sierra Constr. Co. v. Board of Appeals, 33 Misc. 2d 414, 224 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup.
Ct. 1961), aff'd, 15 A.D.2d 859, 227 N.Y.S.2d 213 (4th Dep't 1962).
2. Whittaker v. Village of Franklinville, 265 N.Y. 11, 191 N.E. 716 (1934); Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. People v. Elkin, 196 Misc. 188, 80 N.Y.S.2d 525 (City Ct. Mt. Vernon sitting
as Ct. Spec. Sess. 1948).
4. Whitnall, Abatement of Nonconforming Uses 131 (Institute on Planning and
Zoning, Southwestern Legal Foundation Vol. 2, 1962).
5. Note, Zoning: An Extension of the Police Power, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 78 (1927).
6. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ; Concordia Collegiate Institute
v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950); People v. Olcott, 173 Misc. 87, 16 N.Y.S.2d
256 (Rochester City Ct. 1939). Cf. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907) (general
prosperity); Sabatini v. Andrews, 243 App. Div. 109, 276 N.Y. Supp. 502 (1st Dep't
1934) (public convenience).
7. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court, 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 943 (1927).
8. In re Russell, 158 N.Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1916). See also 7 Buffalo L. Rev.
160 (1957).
9. 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 11-1 (3d ed. 1962); Baddour v.
City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18 (1938).
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ever, a United States Supreme Court case has established that the concept of
aesthetic value contains monetary and health elements 0 and, specifically, that
the legislative power extends to keeping the community beautiful as well as
healthy." This principle presumably supports set-back rules.
Zoning legislation, like much other law, requires some measure of delega-
tion of discretionary authority; and it is settled that, like the state legislature,
a municipality or town may delegate authority to administer its ordinances. 12
The usual judicial criteria involved in questions ,of delegation of legislative
power apply with equal force to questions of delegation in zoning law. Delega-
tions of power must be neither arbitrary' 3 nor discriminatory. 14 Although a
delegation of zoning power may also be invalid as confiscatory, limitations on
land use or value alone are not confiscatory per se. 15 If the restriction of prop-
erty is to a use to which it is- not reasonably adapted,16 or if there is an ex-
treme reduction of the property's value, irrespective of the public gain-then.
the restriction will be held confiscatory.17 In addition, the legislative body
must establish a standard against which the recipient of power may measure
and guide its conduct in the exercise of its authority,' 8 thereby helping to pre-
vent unauthorized actions beyond the purview of the empowering statute.
Without some indication of the restraints intended in the statute, or ordinance
itself, the delegation may be unconstitutional because of an uncertainty of
standard or inadequate definition of the extent of the delegation of power.' 9
In order to make allowances for variances2" and other grey areas in zoning law,
the delegation must provide room for official discretion,21 in order to give its
administrative process a flexible rather than an inflexible quality. Moreover,
the public should know the proper function of the administrative agency in-
volved in order to evaluate its services. These judicial guideposts are better
10. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see Dukeminier, Zoning Aesthetic
Objectives, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 218 (1955); Rodda, The Accomplishment of
Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 So. Cal. L. Rev. 149 (1954).
11. Berman v. Parker supra note 10.
12. Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d
319 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 (1939); Schmitt v. Plonski, 215 N.Y.S.2d 170
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1083 (1958).
13. 1 Rathkopf, op. cit. supra note 9, at 3-5.
14. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Wertheimer v. Schwab, 124 Misc. 822, 210 N.Y. Supp. 312 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
15. Plymouth Builders v. Village of Lindenhurst, 284 App. Div. 895, 134 NX.S.2d
225 (2d Dep't 1954); see 1 Rathkopf, op. cit. supra note 9, at 6-1.
16. Rockdale Constr. Co. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 301 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E.2d 76
(1950).
17.. Town of Somers v. Camarco, 126 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct: 1953), modified and
aff'd, 284 App. Div. 979, 135 N.Y.S.2d 42 (2d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 537, 127
N.E.2d 327 (1955).
18. Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938).
19. Bar Harbor Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc. 2d 894, 196 N.Y.S.2d
856 (Sup. Ct. 1959). Contra, Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281
N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319 (1939) (matter dealt with well within police power); Jaffe,
Delegation of Legislative Power (pt. 2), 47 Colum. L. Rev. 561, 587 (1947).
20. 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 211 (1962).
21. Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938); Eubank v. Richmond, 226
U.S. 137 (1912).
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described as procedural safeguards. 22 In other words, the availability of ready
review and appeal to administrators of the zoning law should be emphasized
more than the requirement of statutory standards. The necessity for restraint
is further shown in another United States Supreme Court decision which held
that legislative sanction of set-back lines, privately determined but officially
established, was unconstitutional.23
In the instant case, the majority opinion avoided the delegation constitu-
tionality issue by concluding that there was simply no delegation of power at
all. The majority determined that the 1961 ordinance applied; and since the
four houses built in 1958, already existed in 1961, the ordinance merely re-
quired conformity to the average of their set-backs. There could be no claim
that the set-back requirement was confiscatory and therefore void since if peti-
tioner's house were built on its 150 foot lot, using an eighty-two foot set-back
line, there would be "plenty of room" for backyard without any "apparent dis-
advantage or inconvenience of any kind."' 24 Citing section twenty-six of the
1961 ordinance, the petitioner had contended that if a lot map were filed prior
to the enactment of the new ordinance, the 1945 ordinance applied. Answering
this point, the majority said that the 1945 ordinance contained a similar set-
back provision. Secondly, it reasoned that the section twenty-six exemption
was intended to apply only where upzoning occurred; that is, redistricting into
a more restrictive zone, thus depriving the owner of his previous rights. This
reasoning was also used to dispose of petitioner's alternative argument that
section 265-a of the N.Y. Town Law gave a similar exemption. Rejecting the
majority rationale, the minority held that section twenty-six did exempt
petitioner's lot by virtue of the fact that a lot map had been filed before en-
actment of the 1961 legislation. This analysis raised the delegation issue since,
if the 1945 ordinance did apply, the Eubank v. Richmond doctrine could be
invoked. Basically, the minority agreed with petitioner that Eubank was in point.
Consequently, they declared as unconstitutional any grant of power to prop-
erty owners which could be used to limit the property rights of prospective
builders wthout a legislative standard to limit arbitrary individual taste in
establishing such set-backs. In the Eubank case, the parties filed a paper which
compelled public officials to set the desired line; while, in the instant case,
the actual construction of houses set the desired line. Despite this factual
distinction, the minority found no difference in constitutional principle.
The majority opinion fails to establish the connection between the set-
back requirement at issue and a valid exercise of the police power. In what
way was the privately established, eighty-two foot set-back, or any one like it,
related to public health, welfare, or morals? A minimum of sixty feet was legis-
latively provided for contingencies such as street or widening, as well as to in-
sure adequate room for fire-fighting operations. The only convincing relation-
22. Davis, Administrative Law § 2.09, at 42 (1959).
23. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
24. Instant case at 83, 187 N.E.2d at 125, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
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ship between the ordinance and a proper purpose is the retention of property
by recognizing the inherent dependence of such values upon the appearance of
adjacent buildings. If widespread non-conformity and bizarre set-back varia-
tions were allowed, then originally built homes might be, in some measure,
depreciated. As far as public health and welfare are concerned, one official
source has recommended a backyard minimum of thirty-five feet.2 5 It is prob-
able that the depth of an average modern home built on an eighty-two foot line
in a 150 foot lot could leave less than thirty-five feet for a backyard. A more
persuasive opinion could have resulted if aesthetic and monetary considerations
had been used to justify the set-back ordinance. Then it might have been
argued that the police power had been validly exercised to preserve these
public values. A second weakness arose from the majority's failure to explain
why the 1961 ordinance applied, leading to its conclusion that there was no
delegation of power. The majority's observation that the 1945 ordinance con-
tained a similar set-back provision was immaterial and only re-enforced peti-
tioner's position on the delegation issue. Inadequate reasons were given for
rejecting petitioner's section twenty-six argument. This section's first sentence
dealt with upzoning, while the second dealt with prior filing. In the majority's
view, such a juxtaposition of sentences meant the legislative intent was that
the filing exemption referred only to upzoning situations. This construction
seems questionable. It appears more logical that sentence one established only
a broad exemption to non-conforming uses already in existence. Lot map filings
would serve no purpose here. If sentence one were intended to cover open lots,
filing would again be unnecessary. This time because by any upzoning the
existence and location of open lots affected would be known anyway. If this
were so, two distinct exempt classes would arise-non-conforming uses and
prior filings. One of these classes necessarily included petitioner's property,
26
causing the 1945 ordinance to apply and opening to question the delegation
of power given by that ordinance. It is interesting to note that although the
alleged exemption of N.Y. Town Law, section 265-a, was rejected on the same
basis, this section in no way refers to upzoning in the same sense as does
ordinance section twenty-six. Since the majority concluded that the ordinance
was such that no delegation of power was made, the decision only adds to an
already established series of precedents on the subject. However, if an appeal
is taken from enforcement of the 1961 set-back provision where conformity
to set-back lines privately created after its enactment, is required, then the
minority opinion should be more persuasive. It may be still more persuasive
where a particular application of the ordinance results in an owner being re-
stricted to an inordinately short backyard, or, virtually none at all. This deci-
sion makes possible such a result.
Leslie G. Foschio
25. N.Y. Dep't of Commerce, Zoning in New York State 31 (1961).
26. See N.Y. Dep't of Commerce, Local Planning and Zoning 75 (1961).
